fix(#2): cap domain cert cache at 64 entries
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@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ The MITM proxy matches intercepted API traffic to cascade IDs by scanning for `m
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### 2. Domain Certificate Cache Is Unbounded
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### ~~2. Domain Certificate Cache Is Unbounded~~ ✅ FIXED
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**File:** `src/mitm/ca.rs` — `domain_cache`
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The `domain_cache` (`HashMap<String, Arc<ServerConfig>>`) grows without bound. Each unique domain gets a cached entry containing a full `ServerConfig` with an RSA key pair. In practice, only ~5–10 domains are intercepted so this is unlikely to matter, but there's no eviction.
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~~The `domain_cache` (`HashMap<String, Arc<ServerConfig>>`) grows without bound.~~
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**Fix:** Set a max cache size (e.g., 100 entries) with LRU eviction, or use a TTL since leaf certs are generated with a 1-year validity.
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**Fixed:** Added a 64-entry cap with clear-on-overflow. In practice only ~5-10 domains are ever intercepted, so this is a safety valve. Full LRU would be overkill.
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